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I. INTRODUCTION
The jury is the seat of substantial power in Amer-
ican society. It is, in theory, the voice of the people.
Jury service has been called "a duty as well as a privi-
lege of citizenship which cannot be shirked on a plea
of inconvenience or decreased earning power,"' and
exclusion from jury service has been called an "asser-
tion of . . . inferiority." 2 Despite the democratic
rhetoric, however, jury service has been reserved for
white males.
Sex discriminatory treatment of women is deeply
embedded in the jury system. Historically, the jury
in both England and the United States was limited to
"free and lawful men."'3 By 1968, all state provisions
disqualifying women from juries had been repealed, 4
but the last remaining affirmative registration system
for women was not invalidated until 1975 by the Su-
preme Court in an opinion which finally recognized
the serious constitutional implications of exclusion of
women from jury service.'
Although women are no longer excluded from
juries, automatic exemptions discourage a large num-
ber of women from serving. In some cases, the ex-
emption is based purely on sex; in others, it is based
on having custody and/or care of a child or other
dependent person.0 Such specialized treatment is
based on the sex stereotyped assumption that wom-
an's proper and all-consuming role is as homemaker
*Copyright © 1975 California Commission on the Status
of Women, Equal Rights Amendment Project. Reprinted with
their permission.
**The authors are affiliated with the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights.
'Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217,224-25 (1946).
'
2Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 U.S.
320, 330 (1970), quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 308 (1879).
3Miller, The Woman Juror, 2 ORE. L. REV. 30 (1922)
[hereinafter cited as Miller].
4The last state to repeal its provision disqualifying women
from jury service was Mississippi, in 1968. The present statute
provides no special exemption for women. MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 13-5-23 (1972).
'Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S.Ct. 692 (1975).
'See text accompanying notes 11-19 infra.
and child rearer. 7 Jury service is thus rationalized as
a special burden for women, regardless of whether it
would entail any special hardship.
Sex differentiated treatment frequently results in
gross or substantial underrepresentation of women
sitting on juries, thus denying litigants their fifth and
sixth amendment rights to a fair and impartial jury
drawn from a cross section of the community. Re-
gardless of whether categorical exemptions produce
so severe an underrepresentation of women on the
jury as to run afoul of this principle," such exemptions
also deny equal protection of the laws to potential
women jurors and women in general. The exemptions
violate equal protection in that they apply an un-
warrantedly lenient standard to women. As such they
perpetuate the sex stereotyped presumptions that
women's societal function is primarily domestic and
women's participation in this important civic institu-
tion is unnecessary, or, at best, less valuable and
acceptable than men's.
The authors believe that any automatic and cate-
gorical excuse afforded women on the basis of their
sex or status as mothers is unconstitutional and detri-
mental to the achievement of women's equal status
in society. We believe that real unavailability because
of child care can be adequately accounted for within
the traditional structure of the discretionary hardship
excuse, which requires an individualized showing of
undue burden. 9
If existing equal protection principles were to be
correctly applied by the courts to the question of
women's jury service, sex based categorical treatment
and sex neutral exemptions which have a sex dis-
parate impact would-be invalidated. But given the
capriciousness of the Supreme Court on questions of
sex stereotyped treatment, 10 it may be that only the
passage of the equal rights amendment will assure
women equal and individualized treatment in this
important civic institution.
'See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961). See also text
accompanying notes 43-54 in/ra.
8See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202. 209 (1965). citing
Cassell v. Texas, 339 'U.S. 282, 286-87 (1950). for the sta-
tistically questionable proposition that underrepresentation
by 10% is insufficient to support a claim of purposeful dis-
crimination.
'Even a sex neutral child care exemption would have a sex
discriminatory impact since women are still identified as and
perform as the primary child rearers in our society.
'"Compare Kahn v. Shevin. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). with Bal-
lard v. Schlesinger. 419 U.S. 498 (1975). and Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 95 S.Ct. 1225 (1975).
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II. STATE AND FEDERAL JURY SELECTION SYSTEMS
A. Exemptive Provisions
Although jury service is required of all citizens
throughout the United States in both state and federal
courts, all judicial systems employ various kinds of
exemption or excuse to relieve certain persons or
classes of persons from jury duty. Exemptions or
excuses are either categorical in nature, based on a
person's occupation or status," or require an indi-
vidualized showing of hardship. 12
In the vast majority of federal districts and in two-
fifths of the states women are exempted automatically
on the basis of presumed hardship, whereas men are
excused only upon an individualized showing. This
categorical treatment takes three different forms:' 3
1. Categorical exemptions for women
Four states excuse women solely on the basis of
their sex, setting up no presumptions of hardship
whatever.14
2. Child care exemptions for women
"These exemptions vary widely in the different systems, but
generally include such groups as public officials, police, clergy,
attorneys, physicians, dentists, teachers-if actively engaged
in the practice of their profession. Though a narrow class of
these exemptions may be mandatory and therefore disqualify
the potential juror (e.g., police, fire-fighters), in general the
categorical exemption is optional and may be claimed or
waived by the prospective juror. As the Supreme Court noted
in Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S.Ct. 692, 700 (1975), exemption
is permissible for "occupations the uninterrupted performance
of which is critical to the community's welfare."
1 The individualized hardship excuse may be either express-
ly provided for by statute or implicit in the power of the
courts to excuse those individuals for whom jury service
would be unduly burdensome.
"
3 Until the decision in Taylor v. Louisiana 95 S.Ct. 692
(1975), a fourth system, upheld in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S.
53 (1961), requiring women to affirmatively register for jury
service was permissible.
"4ALA. CODE tit. 30 § 21 (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 59-124.(1965); MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(b) (1970); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 22-101, 22-108 (1955); D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
ANN. § 11-2303(c) (1966).
A fifth state, New York, has only recently repealed its
blanket exemption for women. Ch. 4, [1975] N.Y. Acts 1641
(Feb. 5, 1975), repealing N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 599(7)
(McKinney 1968).
In addition, there are miscellaneous excuses or exemptions
granted only to women. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01 (1974)
(pregnant women); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234 § IA
(1974) (women exempted, at judge's discretion, upon repre-
sentation that she would "be embarrassed by hearing the
testimony or discussing same in the jury room").
In Nebraska and Rhode Island women are called for jury
service only after there have been facilities provided for them.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 9-9-11 (1974).
Five states and more than two-thirds of the federal
districts grant automatic excuses to women merely on
the showing of legal custody or care of a child.' 5 The
requisite age of the child for the child care excuse
varies substantially from state to state and from fed-
eral district to federal district, ranging from five years
to majority. In federal jurisdictions the age may even
vary from district to district within one state. 16
3. Sex neutral child care excuses
Finally, three states and five federal districts grant
categorical excuses or exemptions for child custody
or care on a sex neutral basis. 17 Although neutral on
their face, these provisions will predictably be dis-
proportionately exercised by women because women
are still largely the primary childrearers in our
society.
In contrast to these states and the majority of fed-
eral districts, thirty-one states and six federal districts
'.'A. State
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-218 (1960) (care of children
under 16); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01 (1974) (children under
18); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 28 (Supp. 1974) (minor
children); TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 2135(2) (Supp. 1974)
(children under 10); UTAH COD- ANN. § 78-46-10(14) (Supp.
1973) (minor children).
In Wyoming, a woman may be excused "when household
duties or family obligations require her absence." Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-80 (Supp. 1973).
B. Federal
Under five years ( 1): P.R. Under seven years (48): W.Va.,
N; W.Va.,S; Alaska; Cal.,C; Canal Zone; Colo.; Fla.,S; Fla.,
M; Fla.,N; Ga.,N; Ga.,M; Ga.,S; Idaho; lll.,E; La.,E; La.,
W; La.,M; Minn.; Miss.,S; D.C.; Nebr.; Nev.; N.Y.,N; N.Y.,
S; N.Y.,W.; N.C.,W; N.D.; Ohio,N; Ohio,S; Okla.,N; Okla.,
S; Okla.,W; Ore.; Pa.,M; Pa.,W; S.D.; Tenn.,M; Tenn.,W;
Tex.,N; Tex.,S; Tex.,W; Tex.,E; Utah; Va.,W; V.I.; Wash.,
E; Wisc.,W; Wyo. Under twelve years (7): Cal.,E; Conn.;
Ga.,W; Md.; S.C.; Va.,E; Wisc.,E. Under thirteen years (I):
N.Mex. Under jourteen years (3): Cal.,S; Ill.,N; Ind.,S. Un-
der fifteen years ( I): Colo. Under sixteen years (6): Ariz.;
Kan.; Me.; N.Y.,E; Pa.,E; R.I. Below high school (1): Mont.
Children of tender years ( I): Cal.,N.
Six districts use a somewhat stricter standard, as for ex-
ample Wash.,W., which only grants an excuse where the
woman does not have adequate domestic assistance to help
with care of her child. See also Ill.,S; Ind.,N; Mich.,W; Mo.,
W; and Mo.,E.
6In California, for example, the requisite age of the chil-
dren varies in the four federal districts: N.D. (tender years);
C.D. ( 10 years); E.D. (12 years); S.D. (14 years).
"
7A. State
N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A:69-2(g) (Supp. 1975) (minor
children); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-1304 (Supp. 1974)
(children-no age specified); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-208.6(26)
(Supp. 1975) (16 years or younger).
B. Federal
Ky.,W; Mass.; Mich.,E; N.H.; N.J. (This provision also
relates to care or custody of another person unable to care for
himself or herself due to illness or physical or mental dis-
ability.)
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have neither special treatment for women nor special
excuses for child care. 8 In these states and federal
districts, a woman or man who demonstrates that
s/he would be truly burdened by jury service because
of child care or other responsibilities can apply for an
individualized hardship excuse. 19
B. Impact on Jury Venires
There is presently very little statistical evidence
concerning the impact of these various systems on
jury venires. Available evidence, however, shows that
the various sex based exemptions and excuses operate
to reduce the number of women serving on juries to
varying degrees. The affirmative registration system
struck down in Taylor v. Louisiana21 produced enor-
mous disparity bordering on complete exclusion; by
contrast to their 53 percent of the population, women
comprised only 10 percent of the total jury lists and
0.66 percent of the resulting venires.2 1 New York
State's recently repealed blanket exemption for wom-
18ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-202 (Supp. 1974); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 39-112-39-114 (Supp. 1973); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 201 (1972); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-71-111 (1973);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4504 (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 609-3 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 2-211 (Supp. 1975); IND.
CODE § 33-4-5.5-73 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 607.2 (Supp.
1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-117 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 29.035 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 1211
(1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. CJ §§ 8-209,210 (1974); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27A-1307(2) (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 593.02 (Supp. 1975); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-23 (1972);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 6.020 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 500-A: 19, A:21 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-2
(Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-6 (Supp. 1974);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-09.1-10,11 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2313.12 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 10.040
(1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 130.11 (Supp. 1975); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 38-104 (Supp. 1974); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 16-13-11 (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, App. VII
R. 27,28 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.36.080 (Supp.
1974); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 52-1-2 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 255.02 (1971. The new Louisiana Constitution no longer
provides for registration for women nor any special exemp-
tion. Exemptions are to be determined by the court. LA.
CONST. art. V, § 33 (1975). Also, New York has recently re-
pealed its blanket exemption for women, and at present there
are no special exemptions for women. See note 14 supra.
19The absence of a codified exemption, however, does not
preclude the possibility that such hardship excuses, discre-
tionarily granted, may amount in practice to categorical treat-
ment.
2095 S.Ct. 692 (1975).
1ld. at 695.
In Queens County, New York, which also maintained an
affirmative registration system, only 3.4% of the jury pool
was female. THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR COURT
ADMINISTRATION, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST & SECOND DE-
PARTMENTS, NEW YORK STATE SUPREME COURT, THE JUROR
IN NEW YORK CITY: A SURVEY OF ATTITUDES AND EXPE-
RIENCES 105 (1973).
Joanne Young
en appears to have consistently produced a pool con-
sisting of less than 20 percent women.2 2 In Alabama,
the blanket exemption for women has produced ve-
nires which are 16 percent female ;23 in Tennessee, it
has resulted in venires on which women represented
only 0.9 percent of the pool.24
Available statistics suggest that the sex based child
care exemptions also substantially reduce, though not
as dramatically, the number of women in the jury
pool. In United States v. Briggs,21 the evidence showed
that approximately 27 percent of women drawn for
service availed themselves of the automatic exemp-
tion for women with custody of a child under 1.0
years. Significantly, 48.8 percent of the women claim-
ing the excuse were either employed or actively seek-
ing employment and therefore were not occupied full-
2
'
2See Dekosenko v. Brandt, 62 Misc. 2d 895, 313 N.Y.S.2d
827 (S.Ct. 1970), afl'd, 26 App. Div.2d 796, 318 N.Y.S.2d
915 (1st Dept. 1971); People v. Attica Brothers, 79 Misc.2d
492, 359 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1974) (because of women's un-
qualified right to seek exemption, the jury clerks deliberately
selected more names of men than women from the jury lists).
2 See Penn v. Eubanks, 360 F. Supp. 699 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
24See Stubblefield v. Tennessee (Crim. App., Henry Co.,
Sept. 1973), appeal dismissed, 95. S.Ct. 820 (1975).
'Affidavit of J. Schulman of May 6, 1973 in support of
defendant's motion to dismiss, United States v. Briggs. 366
F. Supp. 1356 (N.D. Fla. 1973).
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time with child care responsibilities. 26 The evidence
also showed a substantial impact on the representa-
tion of younger women. Of all potential women
jurors between the ages of 20 and 29, 43.3 percent
claimed the child custody exemption.2 1
No statistics have yet been compiled on the impact
of the sex neutral child care exemptions. Likewise,
formal data has not yet been collected on the extent
to which the individualized hardship excuse is em-
ployed by men and women to seek excuse by reason
of child care responsibilities. It appears, however,
that at least where personal appearance is required
in order to apply for an individualized hardship ex-
cuse, very few women even seek excuse for child
care.
28
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SEX BASED
JURY SELECTION SYSTEMS
The history of judicial treatment of sex based dis-
crimination in jury selection systems reveals that,
despite early recognition that jury service is an im-
portant aspect of citizenship, jury selection has been
an area in which male judges and legislators have
been particularly myopic in viewing women's role.
Undoubtedly because of the historic importance given
to the American jury, women's participation in the
institution has been consistently minimized.
Whether by outright exclusion or by disparate
treatment based on the notion that "woman is still
regarded as the center of home and family life,"'29 sex
discrimination in jury selection systems has been
justified primarily on the ground that, for women,
jury service is an interference with domestic respon-
sibilities, the uninterrupted performance of which is
more important to society than her participation on
the jury. From Strauder v. West Virginia, in which
the Supreme Court stated in dicta that a state may
constitutionally confine jury service to males, 0 until
2"Id. at 6. See also Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Mar-
shall v. Gavin, No. 74-190 (filed Aug. 28, 1974).
"Id. at 10 n.25.
Statistics are not available on the ultimate proportion of
men and women in the jury pool studied. The permissibility
of such categorical exemptions should not turn, however, on
whether substantial statistical imbalance between men and
women results. See text accompanying notes 63-68 infra.
'SThe authors of this paper attempted to determine the
number of women seeking excuse for child care in preparing
for a jury challenge in State v. Joan Little. The system does
not record the reason for excuse. However, the fact that very
few women under 35 years of age sought hardship excuses
suggests that the care of young children is infrequently
claimed as a hardship.
2aHoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
0100 U.S. 303 (1879).
the recent Taylor decision, the courts have continually
viewed women on the basis of gross, stereotyped as-
sumptions. They have refused to treat discrimination
against women's jury service seriously, let alone scru-
tinize it with the care required, given the impact of
this discrimination on litigants, women as a class and
society as a whole.
A. Histofcal Overview
The English common law jury was limited to "free
and lawful" men.31 This common law rule prevailed
in the United States until the late 1800s. The Con-
stitution provided no obstacle to maintaining this
system. Challenges to the exclusion of women under
the fourteenth amendment were precluded by dicta
in Strauder v. West Virginia.3 2 The Supreme Court's
refusal to bring women's jury service within the pur-
view of the Constitution effectively continued until
1975.
In view of Strauder, jury service for women was
not even a possibility until ratification of the nine-
teenth amendment in 1920, since eligibility for jury
service in many states depended on the right to vote.
Even after ratification, which should have auto-
matically extended jury service in those states which
made electors eligible for jury service, five state
courts refused this logical step.33 Reasoning that the
nineteenth amendment (as compared with the fif-
teenth amendment)3 4 "conferred the suffrage on an
entirely new class of human beings," one state court
refused to interpret the word "person" in the jury
statute to include women, even in the face of statutes
making all "persons" qualified to vote. 35
In Ballard v. United States,36 where the exclusion
"
1See generally. Clark, Twelve Good Persons and True:
Healy v. Edwards and Taylor v. Louisiana, 9 HARV. Civ. RTs.-
Civ. LIB. L. REV. 561 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Clark];
Miller, supra note 3.
There were only two exceptions to the English rule: When
a woman pleaded pregnancy, a writ permitted a jury of
twelve matrons to examine the woman if 1) she was subject
to capital punishment and wanted a stay of execution until
the birth of her child; or 2) she wanted the disposition of her
husband's estate postponed until the birth of a child she
claimed to be carrying. However, even in these cases, the
examination was performed in the presence of twelve men as
well.
32100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879). See text accompanying note 30
supra; Clark, supra note 31, at 564.
3See cases cited in BABCOCK, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1974) at 67 n.28.
Six more courts declined to extend the right to service by
analogy to the right to vote. Id. at 68 n.29.
4See Neal v. Deternan, 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
3See Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 399, 177 N.E.
656, cert. denied, 289 U.S. 684 (1932).
36329 U.S. 187 (1946).
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of women from federal juries was held to violate
federal statute,3" the Supreme Court described in
dicta the impact of excluding women in terms which
evinced the first sensitivity to the seriousness of their
absence and suggested that women's jury service
might be accorded constitutional protection. The
hope was extinguished in Fay v. New York,38 where
the New York exemption, which the Court charac-
terized as allowing women to "volunteer" for jury
service, 39 passed the due process test.40 The Court
relied heavily on the historical disqualification of
women, which continued well after enactment of the
fourteenth amendment, to conclude that women's
representation on state juries does not derive from a
constitutional right to equal status but rather from
"a changing view of women in our public life."'4,
Hoyt v. Florida42 was the next women's challenge
heard by the Court. By this time, few state statutes
remained which disqualified women. The battle-
ground had shifted from disqualification to unequal
treatment. At issue in Hoyt was the constitutionality
of Florida's affirmative registration provision for
women which dictated that women would be sum-
moned to serve only if they specially registered with
the clerk. The Supreme Court rejected the constitu-
tional challenge on the basis that:
[D]espite the enlightened emancipation of wom-
en from the restrictions and protections of by-
gone years, and their entry into many parts of
community life formerly considered to be re-
served for men, woman is still considered as
the center of home and family life.43
To disguise the exclusionary impact of the Florida
37The Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, prescribed that fed-
eral grand jurors have the same qualifications as those re-
quired by the highest court of the state in which the federal
court was sitting. Thus, women were absent from federal
juries where disqualified by state law. As of 1945, 17 states
disqualified women. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289
n.31 (1947).
In Ballard the Court invalidated the jury because of the
federal court's refusal to follow California law, which per-
mitted women to serve.
Women's participation on federal juries depended on their
status under state law until the 1957 Civil Rights Act made
women independently eligible to serve on federal juries. It
was not until the 1968 Jury Service and Selection Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (1970), that sex discrimination in fed-
eral jury selection was affirmatively prohibited.
38332 U.S. 261 (1947).
391d. at 277-78.
4 In Fay, the Court did not even attempt to apply the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause, then narrowly
construed, to test the women's exemption. Compare Murphy,
J., dissenting, id. at 296-300.
4 1d. at 290.
42368 U.S. 57 (1961).
431d. at 62.
provision, the Court completely distorted the statisti-
cal information. 44 Hoyt thus reconfirmed in 1961
that women's participation is utterly insignificant to
the representativeness of the jury;45 it also estab-
lished the "modern" rationale for exclusionary prac-
tices-the primacy of home and family."6
The stereotyped assumptions which Hoyt en-
shrines have been invoked by most lower state and
federal courts to sustain other exclusionary or "benefi-
cent" systems, including Mississippi's previous stat-
utory disqualification. 4
New York's blanket exemption for women was
upheld in Dekosenko v. Brandt, despite a showing
that women were less than 20 percent of the avail-
able pool. 48 The judge's mocking comments demon-
sirate the stigmatizing impact on women of the op-
tional exemption:
Plaintiff [a female litigant] is in the wrong forum.
Her lament [that women were insufficiently rep-
resented on the jury] should be addressed to the
"Nineteenth Amendment State of Womanhood"
which prefers cleaning and cooking, rearing of
children and television soap operas, bridge and
canasta, the beauty parlor and shopping, to be-
coming embroiled in plaintiff's problems with
her landlord.4
9
The "lament" fared no better in federal court. But in
Leighton v. Goodman50 the court chose to extol
woman's industriousness in the home to justify her
exemption:
Granted that some women pursue business
careers, the great majority constitute the heart
of the home, where they are busily engaged in
the 24-hour a day task of producing and rear-
ing children, providing a home for the entire
family, and performing the daily household
work, all of which demands their full energies.
Although some women now question this ar-
rangement, the state legislature has permitted
the exemption in order not to risk disruption of
this basic family unit. Its action was far from
arbitrary."
"See id. at 69.
45The Court in Hoyt specifically declined to overrule Sirau-
der. Id. at 60.
"See note 44 supra.
47See State v. Hall, 187 So.2d 861 (Miss. 1966).
4862 Misc.2d 895, 313 N.Y.S.2d 827 (S.Ct. 1970), afl'd, 26
App. Div.2d 796, 318 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1st Dept. 1971). Since
the Taylor decision, the New York State legislature has re-
pealed the blanket exemption for women.
49313 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
"°311 F. Supp. 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
5 Id. at 1183.
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Wanda Trimieu
Leighton, decided in 1970, reflects the extent to
which the courts conveniently, and self servingly,
presume women to be indispensable not only to the
child rearing function but also to the maintenance of
the home and family generally. Thus, the notion that
the state has an interest in encouraging and main-
taining women in the role of serving the family justi-
fies devices which discourage women from jury
participation. 52 White v. Crook5 3 is the earliest fed-
eral court decision to find a state disqualification of
women from jury service to be a denial of equal
protection.
Since the Supreme Court's recognition of equal
protection for women under the fourteenth amend-
ment in Reed v. Reed14 and Frontiero v. Richard-
"
2See also Archer v. Thayer, 213 Va. 633, 194 S.E.2d 707
(1973), wherein the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of an exemption for women who have legal
custody and are responsible for a child up to the age of 16 or
for a person having a mental or physical impairment requir-
ing continuous care based on its "reasonable recognition ...
that women are usually the persons who perform such ser-
vice."
5'251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
54404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Only one sex discrimination challenge to a federal jury
selection system prevailed during this period. In United
son,55 some courts have found that special treatment
of women's jury service violated equal protection.5 6
However, prior to Taylor, other courts had not found
Reed and Frontiero sufficient authority to invalidate
sex based distinctions. 57 For this reason, Taylor takes
on major importance.
B. Taylor v. Louisiana: Its Implications
In Taylor, the Supreme Court for the first time
held that exclusion of women from jury venires de-
prives a criminal defendant of the sixth amendment
right to trial by an impartial jury drawn from a fair
cross section of the community.5" Although Taylor
has limitations which derive from its sixth amend-
ment context, it is a milestone in that it rejects the
sex stereotyped myth of women's domesticity there-
tofore employed to sustain exclusionary selection
systems.
The limitation of the Taylor holding derives from
two factors: (1) the challenger was a male defen-
dant; and (2) the affirmative registration system at
issue produced a virtual exclusion of women.59
Finding that Taylor had standing as a defendant, 6
States v. Zirpolo, 450 F.2d 424 (3rd Cir. 1970), the jury com-
missioner's practice of drawing twice as many men as women
from the list was invalidated because it violated the federal
law and limited women's representation on the jury lists to
30%. Significantly, in United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564
(1st Cir. 1970), the court held that a jury list comprised of
only 36% women raises prima facie an inference of discrimi-
nation. The inference, however, was negatived by a finding
of good faith.
55411 U.S. 677 (1973).
56See Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La.
1973); Penn v. Eubanks, 360 F. Supp. 699 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
In Healy v. Edwards, the district court expressly re-
fused to follow Hoyt v. Florida, stating that "[w]hen today's
vibrant principle is obviously in conflict with yesterday's
sterile precedent, trial courts need not follow the outgrown
dogma." 363 F. Supp. at 1117.
"TMarshal v. Holmes, 365 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Fla. 1974),
afj'd without opinion, 495 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied sub nora. Marshall v. Gavin, 95 S.Ct. 825 (1975);
Nat'l Organization for Women-N.Y. Ch. v. Goodman, 374
F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
5895 S.Ct. 692, 694 (1975).
5 Stipulations were entered in the case which acknowledged
that 53 % of the persons eligible for jury service in the judicial
district were women, that only 10% of the persons on the
jury wheel in the parish were women, that during a year
period only 12 women out of 1800 persons were drawn to fill
petit jury venires and that the discrepancy between women
eligible for jury service and those actually included in the
venires was the result of the operation of the affirmative
registration system.
"The Court dealt with the standing question by analogy to
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 403 (1972), which recognized the
standing of a white criminal defendant to challenge his con-
viction because of the systematic exclusion of blacks from
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the Court focuses exclusively on his claim that his
constitutional right to a trial by a jury drawn from a
fair cross section of the community was denied. The
Court holds that because "women are, sufficiently
numerous and distinct from men," the sixth amend-
ment is violated "if, they are systematically elimi-
nated from jury panels."6 The Court stated:
[I]t is no longer tenable to hold that women as
a class may be excluded or given automatic
exemption based solely on sex if the conse-
quence is that criminal jury venires are almost
totally male.62
This passage expressly directs the invalidation of
the few remaining blanket women's exemptions,
which almost inevitably produce a substantial dimi-
nution of women.63 Notwithstanding the clear direc-
tion of Taylor, however, judicial interpretation has
been equivocal.6 4
Moreover, the Court's reasoning suggests the im-
portance, if not necessity, of showing a significant
disparity between women in the population and
women on the jury venire to prove a defendant's
sixth amendment claim. It thus seems very unlikely
that courts will treat Taylor as sufficient authority
to invalidate the widely used sex discriminatory ex-
emptions where the exemption does not substantially
dilute women's participation on the jury.65
Taylor, however, has important implications for
application of equal protection principles to elimi-
nate various forms of exemption which discourage
and trivialize women's participation on juries, since
it explodes the stereotyped myth that women are
serving families which would disintegrate under the
jury service. Similarly, in Taylor, the Court held that a male
criminal defendant can object to the exclusion of women from
his jury because "there is no rule that claims such as Taylor's
be made only by those defendants who are members of the
group excluded from jury service." 95 S.Ct. at 695.
61The Court thus seems to have resolved the issue of
whether women as a group constitute a cognizable class. The
language of the Court makes clear its conclusion that women
as a group constitute a class-a "large distinctive group"
which is "numerous and distinct"-for the purpose of jury
selection. Although lower courts had so held previously, and
the federal jury selection statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq.
(1970), mandates this position, the Supreme Court had not
squarely ruled on this issue before. See United States v. Zir-
polo, 450 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Butera,
420 F.2d 564 (lst Cir. 1970). See also, Healy v. Edwards,
363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1973); White v. Crook, 251 F.
Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
6295 S.Ct. at 701.
"
3See Part II supra.
"See, e.g., People v. Prim, - App. Div. 2d __, 366 N.Y.S.
2d 726 (1975); People v. Walker, N.Y.L.J., May 30, 1975 at
20, col. 7.
6 See Part I I supra.
weight of their being subject to jury service. In this
regard the decision parallels the approach dictated
by the Court in Reed.66 Citing Labor Department
statistics on women and women with children in the
labor force, which demonstrate the extreme over-
breadth of the stereotypic presumption, the Court
concludes that "they certainly put to rest the sug-
gestion that all women should be exempt from jury
service based solely on their sex and their presumed
role in the home. ' 7
Taylor also echoes Reed in holding that adminis-
trative convenience is an unacceptable rationale for
sex based differential treatment. The Court defines
two broad categories of permissible exemption:
(1) "individuals in case of special hardship or in-
capacity"; and (2) "those engaged in particular oc-
cupations, the uninterrupted performance of which
is critical to the community's welfare."6 The Court
rejects as "untenable" the proposition that "it would
be a special hardship for each and every woman to
perform jury service or that society cannot spare any
women from their present duties. ' 69 The decision
then points to individualized hardship treatment as
the appropriate means of sorting out those who need
exemption because of child care:
[I]t may be burdensome to sort out those
[women] who should not be exempted from
those who should serve. But that task is per-
formed in the case of men, and the administra-
tive convenience in dealing with women as a
class is insufficient justification for diluting the
quality of community judgment represented by
the jury in criminal trials.7"
Thus, although the Taylor Court restricts its opin-
ion to the impermissibility of categorical treatment
for sixth amendment purposes, its reasoning lays the
groundwork for invalidation under the Reed test of
equal protection of all sex discriminatory exemp-
tions, regardless of their impact on the venire.7 1
66Reed was the first time the Court invalidated a sex based
classification on equal protection grounds. The Court struck
down an Idaho statute which preferred male relatives over
female relatives as administrators of estates, holding arbitrary
the mandatory preference to members of one sex over the
other.




1ln Taylor, the Court refuses to unequivocally overrule
Hoyt. The Court attempts to distinguish Hoyt on the basis
that the defendant there did not raise the fair trial question
seized upon in Taylor, but dealt only with the rational basis
of sex based distinctions. This distinction is clearly specious
as Hoyt invoked both due process and equal protection claims.
Moreover, as discussed in the text, the rejection in Taylor of
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IV. APPLICATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
PRINCIPLES TO JURY COMPOSITION
A. Categorical Treatment Violative of
Women's Rights
When a group such as women is excluded from
jury service-either directly by disqualification or
indirectly by exemption-three levels of injury result.
The first and most obvious is the injury to the liti-
gant. Closely related is the harm to the community
at large and to our judicial system.72 The third and
rarely recognized level of injury is to the members
of the excluded class.
Sex discriminatory jury selection schemes have
been considered almost exclusively from the per-
spective of the criminal defendant or the civil liti-
gant. Lower courts have tended to deny standing to
nonlitigants, both women and men, who bring affir-
mative civil actions challenging unequal treatment
on the basis of sex in jury selection systems. 73 The
general assumption seems to be that nonlitigants
cannot be harmed by the system of jury exemp-
tions.7 4 Even in Healy v. Edwards,7 5 where the court
recognized that affirmative registration denies equal
protection to potential women jurors,76 it questioned
the standing of nonlitigants to raise this issue. 77 It is
the stereotypal myth about women's unavailability and the
administrative convenience rationale renders the scheme irra-
tional under Reed.
"
2See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946),
where the Court said:
The systematic and intentional exclusion of women ...
deprives the jury system of the broad base it was de-
signed by Congress to have in our democratic society.
• . The injury is not limited to the defendant-there is
injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to
the community at large, and to the democratic ideal re-
flected in the processes of our courts.
3See, e.g., Nat'l Organization for Women-N.Y. Ch.
v. Goodman, 374 Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), an action for
a declaratory judgment that the automatic jury exemption
for women is unconstitutional. A female nonlitigant eligible
for an automatic exemption from jury service and a male
nonlitigant claiming substantial responsibility for the care of
small children were denied standing. But see Ford v. White,
430 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1970).
The authors of this article are of the view that equal pro-
tection challenges to sex based child care exemptions lodged
by men are ill-advised in the jury context. When a man with
child care responsibilities is awarded an exemption the result
is extension of the categorical treatment we seek to eliminate.
4See, e.g., Nat'l Organization for Women-N.Y. Ch. v.
Goodman, 374 F. Supp. 247, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
'1363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1973).
711d. at 1114.
"Id. at 1112. The court declined to decide the question of
whether the male and female nonlitigant plaintiffs had stand-
ing, since the presence of intervenor female litigants rendered
not surprising, therefore, that when the merits of
challenges to jury plans have been reached, analysis
has focused primarily on whether the litigant was
afforded a jury composed of a "fair cross section" of
the community.78
By contrast, in affirmative challenges to racial ex-
clusion from juries the Supreme Court has squarely
recognized the harm to the excluded class as well as
to the litigant.79 The harm underlying class standing
was explained in Carter v. Jury Commission of
Greene County:0
Defendants in criminal proceedings do not have
the only cognizable legal interest in nondis-
criminatory jury selection. People excluded
from juries because of their race are as much
aggrieved as those indicted and tried by juries
under a system of racial exclusion .... Whether
jury service be deemed a right, a privilege, or a
duty, the state may no more extend it to some
of its citizens and deny it to others on racial
grounds than it may invidiously discriminate in
the offering and withholding of the elective
franchise. . . .The exclusion of Negroes from
jury service because of their race is "practi-
cally a brand upon them**, an assertion of their
inferiority* *.81
Moreover, in Peters v. Kifl, s2 a suit challenging
the criminal conviction of a white male defendant
on the ground that blacks had been systematically
excluded from the jury, the Court took cognizance
of the interests of the excluded class affected by dis-
criminatory treatment:
[T]he exclusion of negroes from jury service
injures not only defendants, but also other
members of the excluded class: it denies the
class of potential jurors the "privilege of par-
ticipating equally ... in the administration of
justice," 100 U.S., at 308, and it stigmatizes the
whole class, even those who do not wish to par-
ticipate, by declaring them unfit for jury service
and thereby putting "a brand upon them, af-
the case justiciable. Id. The court did note that the female
litigant plaintiffs could properly raise the equal protection
issue that applied to women as a class. Id. at 1114.
"See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S.Ct. 692 (1975).
"Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 U.S.
326 (1970); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 345 (1970). See also,
Broadway v. Culpepper, 439 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1971); Ford
v. White, 430 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1970); Salary v. Wilson,
415 F.2d 467 (6th Cir. 1969); Billingsley v. Clayton, 359
F.2d 13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841 (1966); Mitch-
ell v. Johnson, 250 F. Supp. 117 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
80396 U.S. 326 (1970).
"Id. at 329-30 (footnotes omitted, asterisks in the original).
82407 U.S. 493 (1972).
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fixed by law, an assertion of their inferiority. '8 3
The lower courts' rejection of women's standing
to seek affirmative relief from sex discriminatory
jury exemptions, and their avoidance of the merits
of such claims in light of equal protection principles,
is clearly contrary to the precedents of Carter and
Peters. This stance is also inconsistent with the Su-
preme Court's characterization of jury service as a
privilege, important to those who serve as well as
those who are served by it.
The courts' excuse for not recognizing the stand-
ing of prospective women jurors is that the exemp-
tion system allows women the option of serving. 4
This approach deliberately ignores the impact on the
class. When women receive special treatment in the
jury system, they are effectively told that it is not
important for them to share equally in the adminis-
tration of justice. The implication is that their basic
"civil responsibility" is to "provid[e] a home for the
entire family. 85
Thus, a person need not actually be excluded from
the jury to be "stigmatize[d] . . . [as] unfit for jury
service."8 6 An automatic excuse from jury service
constitutes the same badge of inferiority. Women
are no longer totally excluded as unfit from the ex-
clusive and powerful club of the jury. Rather, they
are given automatic excuses to avoid service on the
basis of their sex and/or motherhood and are told
that although they can no longer be barred, they
really needn't join, because their presence is not
necessary to the good functioning of the club.
' The opportunity to avoid jury duty, which might
otherwise be considered a benefit, is here onl y a
more subtle badge of inferiority and therefore a
deprivation of equal rights.
B. No Justification for Differential Treatment of
Women in the Jury System
The exemptions from jury service accorded wom-
en8 7 are grounded in the assumption that women are
occupied with fulltime child care or homemaking
duties or both. While this assumption may once have
been valid, it does not coincide with today's reality.88
"Id. at 499 (elipsis in the original, emphasis added).
'
4See, e.g., Nat'l Organization for Women-N.Y. Ch. v.
Goodman, 374 F. Supp. 247, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
"Leighton v. Goodman, 311 F. Supp. 1181, 1183 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
"Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 499 (1972).
"See Part II supra for a discussion of these various exemp-
tions.
"Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S.Ct. 692 (1975) at 700 n.17,
citing UNITED STATES DEPT. OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR
FORCE (Oct. 1974). Additionally, in families with children
between the ages of 6 and 17, 67.3% of mothers who were
Labor Department statistics indicate that 54.2
percent of all women between the ages of 18 and 64
are in the labor force, and that 45.7 percent of
women with children under the age of 18 work out-
side the home. 89 As the Court in Taylor so aptly
stated, these statistics "certainly put to rest the sug-
gestion that all women should be exempt from jury
service based solely on their sex and their presumed
role in the home."90 They also make it patently clear
that at least half the women entitled to claim exemp-
tion for child care or custody do not need the excuse.
Surely, if a woman is able to work outside her
home, she is available for jury service. On the basis
of the statistical evidence of workforce participation
of mothers of young children alone, it can be esti-
mated that approximately half of the women who are
now entitled to claim exemption for child care do
not need the excuse. 91 Added to this number is the
multitude of women who are the mainstay of volun-
tary charitable and community organizational work.
Finally, many mothers who do not work outside the
home but could make alternative arrangements for
child care could serve on juries without experiencing
particular hardships. Instead, they are invited to ex-
cuse themselves when their situation does not require
or warrant it.9
2
The jury exemptions accorded women or women
with children because of a presumption of hardship
are therefore grossly overinclusive. Moreover, they
cannot be justified on the ground of administrative
convenience, since the Supreme Court in Taylor
squarely rejected that argument in terms which echo
its holding in Reed.9
Clearly real hardship or inconvenience to the com-
munity or to the individual juror should be recog-
nized as a valid basis for excusal from jury duty.
Where the prospective juror is indispensable to the
care of another person relief from service is appro-
priate. So the dependency of a small child may be
such a circumstance justifying a hardship excuse.
But the state's legitimate interest in providing re-
lief from jury service could be satisfied by condi-
widowed, divorced or separated and 51.2% of mothers whose
husbands were present were in the work force. Even in fami-
lies with children under 3 years old where the husband was
present, 31% of women were in the work force. Id. citing
UNITED STATES DEPT. OF LABOR, MARITAL AND FAMILY CHAR-
ACTERISTICS OF THE LABOR FORCE, Table F (March 1974).
8995 S.Ct. at 700 n.17.
'Old. at 700.
"Id. at 700 n.17.
"See Affidavit of J. Schulman of May 6, 1973 in support of
defendant's motion to dismiss, United States v. Briggs, 366 F.
Supp. 1356 (N.D. Fla. 1973). See also text accompanying
note 25 supra.
9395 S.Ct. at 700.
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tioning excuse on an individualized showing of true
hardship.9 4 This burden could be met by a showing
that the prospective juror-male or female-is in
fact engaged in daily caretaking responsibilities and
that adequate alternative arrangements, taking into
account the young child's needs, are unavailable.
This is the only effective nondiscriminatory solu-
tion.9 It is consistent with the hardship standard
generally applied to prospective jurors. It is neutral
without sacrificing the flexibility necessary to en-
compass a young child's special needs for continuous
care and any special difficulties entailed in finding
alternative care. Indeed, the fact that 30 states, the
District of Columbia and six federal districts pro-
vide no categorical exemption for women attests to
the workability of a neutral and discretionary hard-
ship system.96
Theoretically, ratification of the ERA is not nec-
essary to invalidate all categorical exemptions based
on women's historic domestic or child rearing func-
tion. The piercing of the stereotype and of the ad-
ministrative convenience rationales by the Taylor
Court in the sixth amendment context is mandated
by the equal protection principles outlined in Reed.
V. IMPACT OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
According to the legislative history, the ERA
should absolutely prohibit all classifications based on
sex which are not founded on a single sex character-
istic. 97 Thus ratification of the ERA would mandate
invalidation of both the categorical exemptions for
women and the sex based child care exemptions,
regardless of their statistical impact on the venires.
Finally, under the ERA the Court should invalidate
the facially neutral child care exemption, since it is
likely to be exercised overwhelmingly by women and
it continues an unwarranted standard of presumed
hardship. 9s
94If properly enforced, this procedure would discourage
women who do not need an excuse from seeking it. See note
28 supra.
'See note 9 supra.
"See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
9 See Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Con-
stitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J.
871, 896-900 (1971).
98The Supreme Court has not yet had an occasion to test
the constitutionality under Reed of a facially neutral law hav-
ing a sex disparate impact. There is no reason, however, why
apparently neutral rules in the sex discrimination context
should be subject to less scrutiny than explicit sex based classi-
fications. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971). This is particularly true where the rule relates to
traditionally female functions or attributes such as child
rearing. See, e.g., Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate
School District, 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973), afl'd,
507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975). Title VII's testing of discrimi-
Notwithstanding that proper application of exist-
ing principles would invalidate all exemption schemes
which can be invoked exclusively or predominantly
by women, it is questionable whether the Court will
accept an opportunity to adjudicate the constitution-
ality of categorical treatment where it does not sub-
stantially dilute women's representation on the juries.
Though strict scrutiny is not necessary to invalidate
such treatment, the refusal of a majority of the Court
to declare sex a suspect classification in Frontiero
symbolizes the Court's reluctance to reach beyond
the less than gross discrimination and give clear
direction to the lower courts.99 It is, therefore, specu-
lative whether the Court will exercise its certiorari
or appellate jurisdiction to invalidate the narrower
and apparently neutral child care exemptions.' °
The irresponsibility and capriciousness of the ju-
diciary on questions of sex discrimination heretofore
suggests that the ERA will be politically and prac-
tically necessary to the elimination of the full range
of discriminatory categorical treatment of women in
jury selection systems.
natory neutral rules by a narrow business necessity justifica-
tion is instructive and, moreover, should be applicable to
jury service, since it is a form of employment by state and
local governments.
"The Court's willingness to uphold certain forms of dis-
criminatory treatment of women as "beneficent" flows di-
rectly from the majority's refusal to treat sex as suspect. See
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975); but cf. Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 95
S.Ct. 1225, 1233 (1975). While it would torture logic and
reality to uphold as remedial the categorical jury exemptions,
which perpetuate rather than mitigate women's second class
citizenship, the majority's refusal to acknowledge pregnancy
based classifications as sex discriminatory in Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), demonstrates the Court's de-
liberate refusal to tackle the fundamental bases of second
class citizenship for women.
'In Marshall v. Holmes, 375 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Fla.
1973), aft'd, 495 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub
nonm. Marshall v. Gavin, 420 U.S. 907 (1975), for example,
the lower court opinion rejected a challenge to the federal
jury plan's automatic excuse of women with children under
18 on the ground that the right of women to serve was not in
issue. 375 F. Supp. at 617-18.
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